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Discrimination in Asylum Law: The Implications of
Jean v. Nelson
INTRODUCTION
U.S. immigration law grants the Attorney General discretionary authority
to admit (parole) otherwise inadmissible aliens into the country in cases of
emergency.' This parole statute does not explicitly prohibit the Attorney
General from using race or national origin as a basis for denying parole to
an alien. On June 26, 1985, the Supreme Court decided Jean v. Nelson,2 a
case that challenged the Attorney General's use of his parole discretion.
The Haitian petitioners, who were part of a large influx of undocumented
and unadmitted aliens seeking asylum in the United States, were incarcerated
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") at various federal
detention facilities pending disposition of their asylum applications. The
Haitians claimed that, in denying them parole, the INS violated their rights
under the equal protection clause of the fifth amendment by discriminating
against them on the basis of race and national origin.3 The case reached the
Court after an appellate court ruled that the Haitians could not challenge
the government's detention policy, since they had no constitutional rights
with respect to admission and parole in the United States.4
I. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § I182(d)(5)(A) (1982):
The Attorney General may... in his discretion parole into the United States tem-
porarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for
reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admission to
the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admis-
sion of the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of
the Attorney General, have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned
to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue
to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission
to the United States.
2. Jean v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985).
3. Id. at 2994.
4. The petitioners claimed that the INS violated the notice-and-comment rulemaking pro-
cedures of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by changing the policy of general parole
for undocumented aliens seeking admission to a policy of general detention without parole for
aliens who could not present a prima facie case for admission. They further alleged that this
restrictive policy violated the equal protection guarantee of the fifth amendment. The district
court held for the petitioners on the APA claim, thus invalidating the new policy and releasing
over one thousand Haitians held in detention. However, the district court found that the
petitioners had failed to prove discrimination based on race or national origin and therefore
denied the equal protection claim. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part sub nom., Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (1lth Cir. 1983), vacated as
moot in part on reh'g, rev'd in part on reh'g, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff'd,
105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985).
The Appellate Court Panel, in a strongly-worded opinion, affirmed the district court on
the APA claim, and reversed on the equal protection claim finding that there had been
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The Court refused to rule, however, on the equal protection claim. Instead,
the case was decided solely on statutory grounds. Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, argued that neither the parole statute nor the INS regu-
lations that implement it authorizes discrimination on the basis of race or
nationality. The case was therefore remanded to allow the district court to
determine whether lower-level INS officials had in fact discriminated in
violation of the statute.5
The Court's decision may have disappointed many who had hoped that
the Constitutional issue would be settled, but its refusal to extend equal
protection rights to aliens is hardly surprising. Aliens have traditionally
enjoyed only those rights that Congress has specifically afforded them. 6 The
discrimination against the petitioners' class. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983),
vacated as moot in part on reh'g, rev'd in part on reh'g, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984) (en
banc), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985) (known as Jean I). The INS then promulgated a new rule,
using proper APA procedures, prohibiting consideration of race or national origin in parole
decisions.
The appellate court siting en banc found that the APA claim was moot because the
government was no longer detaining Haitians under the old policy. However, it again reversed
on the discrimination claim, refusing to acknowledge any equal protection rights for aliens:
"[T]here is little question that the Executive has the power to draw distinctions among aliens
on the basis of nationality." Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 978 n.30 (11th Cir. 1984), aff'd,
105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985) (known as Jean II).
5. In Jean v. Nelson, the Supreme Court said: "On remand the District Court must
consider: (1) whether INS officials exercised their discretion under sec. 1182 (d)(5)(A) to make
individualized determinations of parole, and (2) whether INS officials exercised this broad
discretion under the statutes and regulations without regard to race or national origin." Jean
v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. at 2999.
6. Congressional power to discriminate in immigration law has been recognized since the
first immigration statutes were subjected to judicial scrutiny. See The Chinese Exclusion Case,
130 U.S. 581 (1889). Immigration law was considered an inherently political field, not within
the province of the courts and therefore immune from Constitutional review. Thus the Supreme
Court in United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) asserted,
"Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied
entry is concerned."
This harsh doctrine was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Shaughnessy v. United States
ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), where a resident alien was excluded from the U.S. on
unstated security grounds and stranded on Ellis Island because no other country would take
him. The Court held: "Whatsoever our individual estimate of that policy and the fears on
which it rests, respondent's right to enter the United States depends on the Congressional will,
and courts cannot substitute their judgment for the legislative mandate." Id. at 216; see also
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952). In his concurrence in Harisiades,
Justice Frankfurter stated:
But whether immigration laws have been crude and cruel, whether they may have
reflected xenophobia in general or anti-Semitism or anti-Catholicism, the respon-
sibility belongs to Congress .... But the underlying policies of what classes of
aliens shall be allowed to enter and what classes of aliens shall be allowed to stay,
are for Congress exclusively to determine even though such determination may be
deemed to offend American traditions and may, as has been the case, jeopardize
peace.
Id. at 597 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
More recently, courts have continued to uphold Congressional power to discriminate on
the basis of race or national origin in immigration law against all Constitutional challenges.
See Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980);
Hatai v. INS, 343 F.2d 466, 467 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965). Despite the
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Court's refusal to address the Constitutional issue, however, should not
overshadow the far-reaching implications of the decision it did make-
implications that go beyond the relatively narrow issue of parole. This Note
will argue that the Court's decision necessitates dramatic changes in the way
asylum law in general is implemented. The first section discusses the relevant
legislative history of immigration law to show that Rehnquist is correct in
seeing firm nondiscriminatory intent behind the parole statute. More im-
portantly, that section will show that such intent governs not only parole
law, but asylum law as well.
The second section argues that, because the INS is prohibited by statute
from discriminating in asylum cases, two areas of current INS practice must
be restructured in order to bring them into conformity with statutory intent.
The first area concerns the INS practice of basing asylum decisions on
advisory opinions of the State Department. The second involves the standard
of review used by appellate courts in determining whether asylum decisions
involve invidious discrimination.
I. IMMIGRATION LAW AND STATUTORY INTENT
Rehnquist's majority opinion in Jean v. Nelson asserts that Congress
intended the parole statute to be free from invidious discrimination. His
only support for this assertion, however, is negative: nationality-based criteria
are simply absent from the statute. Hence, he concludes, it "must be neutral
as to race or national origin."' 7 This absence-implies-neutrality argument
prompted Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, to charge Rehnquist with
deliberately avoiding the Constitutional issue by "creat[ing] out of whole
cloth nonconstitutional constraints on the Attorney General's discretion to
parole aliens into this country . ... ,, Rehnquist's failure to offer positive
support for his conclusion is not surprising, according to Marshall, "for an
examination of the regulations themselves, as well as the statutes and ad-
ministrative praetices governing the parole of unadmitted aliens, indicates
that there are no nonconstitutional constraints on the Executive's authority
to make national-origin distinctions. "9
civil rights movement and recent strides toward equality for all citizens, Congress retains the
power to discriminate against aliens in any manner it chooses. This tradition prompted the
court in Dunn v, INS, 499 F.2d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1106 (1975),
to make an observation that remains true today:
It is firmly established that Congress has the power to exclude aliens of a particular
race from the United States, prescribe the terms and conditions upon which certain
classes of aliens may come to the country, establish regulations for sending out
of the country such aliens as come here in violation of law and commit the en-
forcement of such provisions to the appropriate executive officers.
See generally Jean v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. at 2999-3012 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
7. Jean v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. at 2999.
8. Id. at 3000.
9. Id. (footnote omitted).
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Rehnquist and Marshall are both correct: the parole statute and regulations
are facially neutral with regard to discrimination; and the parole statutes,
regulations, and practices do not place explicit constraints on the Attorney
General's discretion. 0 But Marshall wrongly infers a statutory construction
permitting parole decisions to be based on race or national origin. This
would be the case only if the history of parole legislation revealed no
congressional intent to bar such discrimination. A careful examination of
the relevant legislative history, however, reveals that immigration law has
made steady progress from highly restrictive to explicitly nondiscriminatory
policies. The culmination of this process was the Refugee Act of 1980, which
brought U.S. policy into conformity with international law. Under the Act,
parole and asylum statutes are clearly intended to preclude invidious dis-
crimination.II
What follows is a discussion of some major developments in the history
of U.S. immigration law. These developments reveal a general trend toward
fairer, less discriminatory policies.
A. The Trend Toward Non-Discrimination
The history of U.S. immigration law has until very recently consisted of
legislation designed to deny entry to any alien who did not meet highly
specific racial, ethnic, or cultural criteria. Historically these statutes, far
from proscribing discrimination on the basis of race or national origin, have
in some cases required it. During the past three decades, however, Congress
and the Executive have made concerted efforts to bring immigration law
into greater conformity with the ideals of fair and equitable treatment that
inspired civil rights legislation. These ideals demand that a person not be
discriminated against on the basis of her race or national origin. Three
important developments demonstrate this steady, if gradual, progress: The
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (the McCarran-Walter Act), the
Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, and The Refugee
Act of 1980.
1. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 19522 is perhaps more significant
because of the debate it caused before and after its passage than for any
10. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1982) (the
statute) and 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (1986) (the regulation). Note that under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a)(2)(C)(v),
parole can be granted to "[a]liens whose continued detention is not in the public interest as
determined by the district director."
11. "Invidious" in this context is meant to refer to discrimination based upon race and
national origin. Hereafter, I shall simply mean "discrimination" to refer to the invidious sort.
12. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
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positive contribution toward eliminating discriminatory immigration policies.
While the Act repealed one section that had totally excluded Orientals,' 3 and
was therefore heralded as having removed racial discrimination, 4 it also left
discriminatory practices effectively in place by preserving national origin
quotas. These quotas, which were introduced into law in 1921, had no other
purpose than to maintain the ethnic composition of the national population.' 5
Quotas for those within the "Asia-Pacific triangle,"'' 6 for example, were
based on ancestry rather than birthplace.' 7
The intense debate over the Act's restrictive policies did not subside after
its passage. President Truman, over whose veto the Act became law, im-
mediately denounced the national origins quota system as being unworthy
of American ideals because it "discriminates, deliberately and intentionally,
against many of the peoples of the world."' 8 Although unsuccessful with
his veto, Truman laid the foundation for an eventual repeal of the national
origins system with the creation of a presidential commission. In its 1953
report, "Whom We Shall Welcome," the commission found that "the major
disruptive influence in our immigration law is the racist and national dis-
crimination caused by the national origins system," and that the present
system should be replaced with a "unified quota system, which would allocate
visas without regard to national origin, race, creed, or color."' 9
Repeated calls for reform during the next decade, however, went unheeded.
Immigration policy between 1952 and 1965 consisted of "ad hoc legislation
to meet the problems and political pressures of the time."' 20 Discrimination
persisted.
13. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, 1653, 1665, 1679.
14. S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1952): "ITihe instant bill makes several
significant changes. Among these are the following: (I) A system of selective immigration within
the national origins quota system is established, geared to the needs of the United States. (2)
Racial discrimination and discrimination based upon sex are removed."
15. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 201(a), 66 Stat. 163, 175 (1952)
(amended 1965):
The annual quota of any quota area shall be one-sixth of I per centum of the
number of inhabitants in the continental United States in 1920, which number,
except for the purpose of computing quotas for quota areas within the Asia-Pacific
triangle, shall be the same number heretofore determined under the provisions of
section 11 of the Immigration Act of 1924, attributable by national origin to such
quota area ....
16. The Asia-Pacific triangle embraces countries from Pakistan to Japan and the Pacific
islands north of Australia.
17. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 202(b), 66 Stat. 163, 175-76 (1952)
(amended 1965).
18. The President's Veto Message, June 25, 1952, reprinted in THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N
ON IMM. AND NAT., WHOM WE SHALL WELCOME 277 (submitted Jan. 1, 1953).
19. THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON IMM. AND NAT., WHOM WE SHALL WELCOME 263 (submitted
Jan. 1, 1953).
20. E.P. HUTcmIsoN, LEOtsLATivE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798-1965
489 (1981).
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2. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965
The movement for reform surged after the 1960 election of President
Kennedy. While still a senator in 1958, Kennedy published A Nation of
Immigrants in which he criticized the national origins quota system for having
"strong overtures of an indefensible racial preference."'" As President, he
introduced legislation to end the quota system. After Kennedy's assassination,
his successor, Lyndon Johnson, took up the bill. In the wake of Johnson's
1964 landslide electoral victory, the national origins standard was abolished
by the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965. 2 The Amend-
ments established a "new system of preferential admissions based upon the
existence of a close family relationship with U.S. citizens or permanent
resident aliens, and upon the advantage to the United States of the special
talents and skills of the immigrant .... "23
The Amendments were one of three complimentary bills passed early in
Johnson's presidency, the others being the Civil Rights Act of 196424 and
the Voting Rights Act of 196 5 .2s The intent of Congress in passing the 1965
immigration amendments was clear. In reference to the bill, Senator Fong
said,
Last year we enacted the historic Civil Rights Act of 1964, which was
designed to wipe out the last vestiges of racial discrimination against our
own citizens .... As we move to erase racial discrimination against our
own citizens, we should also move to erase racial barriers against citizens
of other lands in our immigration laws.26
Fong found that Congress was "seeking an immigration policy reflecting
America's ideal of the equality of all men without regard to race, color,
creed or national origin .... -27 Fong's sentiments were echoed in statements
of other senators and officials who condemned the national origins quota
system as "un-American" and "totally alien to the spirit of the Constitu-
tion," and who praised the new bill for its recognition of individual rights. 28
21. JOHN F. KENNEDY, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTs 77 (1964).
22. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat.
911 (1965).
23. S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws, 3328, 3329. See also Explanation in Question and Answer Form of the Imm. Act of
October 3, 1965, Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., Ist
Sess. 3 (1965).
24. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
25. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
26. Hearings on S. 500 Before the Subcomm. on Imm. and Nat. of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, pt.1, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 44-45 (1965).
27. Id.
28. See id. at Ii (statement of Attorney General Katzenbach), 47 (statement of Secretary
of State Dean Rusk), 127 (statement of Senator Hugh Scott), 165 (statement of Senator Paul
Douglas) and 217 (statement of Senator Robert Kennedy). See also Hearings Before Subcomm.
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When he signed the new bill Johnson pointed to the fairness of the new
legislation. It repealed a system that, in his words, "violated the basic
principle of American democracy-the principle that values and rewards
each man on the basis of his merit .... 29
The Amendments eliminated national quotas and anti-Oriental
discrimination3" but they maintained hemispheric quotas. A ceiling of 170,000
was placed on immigrants from the Eastern Hemisphere with a limit of
20,000 per foreign state. The Western Hemisphere had a limit of 120,000
on a first-come-first-served basis.3' This last vestige of statutory discrimi-
nation was removed by Congress in 1978 when a single world-wide ceiling
of 290,000 was established with no preference system or per-country advan-
tage given to either hemisphere. The establishment of a world-wide ceiling
was declared to be "the ultimate step in eliminating distinctions based upon
an individual's place of origin."
32
B. The Refugee Act of 1980
1. Parole
When Congress originally granted parole authority to the Executive in
1952, it was simply an administrative device to permit aliens conditional
entry while their ultimate legal status was determined. 33 A Congressional
committee report at the time explained the intent of this, provision as follows:
The committee believes that the "broader discretionary authority is nec-
essary to permit the Attorney General to parole inadmissible aliens into
the United States in emergency cases, such as the case of an alien who
requires immediate medical attention before there has been an oppor-
tunity for an immigration officer to inspect him, and in cases where it
is strictly in the public interest to have an inadmissible alien present in
the United States, such as, for instance, a witness for purposes of pros-
ecution24
No. I of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 723 (1964), where the
Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO, James B. Carey, quotes the AFL-CIO Declaration in
support of the bill.
29. T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, IhIGRAON PROCESS AND POLICY 55 (1985).
30. S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in, 1965 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD.
NEWS 3328, 3333.
31. Id. at 3332, 3336, 3338.
32. H.R. REP. No. 1206, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1978) (letter from Assist. See. of
State, Douglas J. Bennett), quoted in CONGRESIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
96TH CoNG., 1sT Sss., U.S. IMM. LAW AND POLICY: 1952-1979, 66 (Comm. Print 1979).
33. Scanlan, Regulating Refugee Flow: Legal Alternatives and Obligations Under the Refugee
Act of 1980, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 618, 630 (1981).
34. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1653, 1706.
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Congressional intent to the contrary notwithstanding, parole power was
repeatedly used to bring large groups of refugees into the country when the
1965 preference system proved inadequate."
While the 1965 legislation and its subsequent amendments eliminated dis-
criminatory language from U.S. immigration law, they did not provide
adequate means of resolving the growing problem of refugees seeking asylum
in the U.S. The numbers and types of refugees often did not meet the
statutory limits and guidelines established for given categories.
The 1965 Amendments established a new preference category in addition to
the six categories based on family ties and skills of the alien. Under the new
seventh preference, "conditional entry" was granted to refugees who could
establish that they had "fled" persecution in a "Communist or Communist-
dominated country," or a "country within the general area of the Middle
East."' ' 6 Such entry was termed "conditional" because its beneficiaries did
not receive immigrant visas, but, rather, a somewhat more "tenuous status"
subject to later adjustment. 7
This status was virtually identical to parole. However, because of the
severe restrictions under the seventh preference, the Executive could admit
few aliens without resorting to the broader parole authority. As a conse-
quence, the Executive was able to use its parole authority for humanitarian
purposes and to promote ideologically-based foreign policy objectives. Ei-
senhower first used the parole authority to bring in 30,000 Hungarian ref-
ugees in 1956. People fleeing Cuba and Indochina were among the post-
1965 beneficiaries of parole." But this parole authority also allowed for the
possibility that the Executive could exercise its discretion in a discriminatory
manner without having to answer to Congress.
The Refugee Act of 1980 closed the refugee-parole loophole. The seventh
preference was repealed and a new section was added to the original parole
provision that explicitly prohibits paroling a refugee unless "the Attorney
General determines that compelling reasons in the public interest with respect
to that particular alien require that the alien be paroled .... "39 So as not
to leave the President without power to decide which refugees he wants to
admit, the 1980 Act established a refugee quota system in addition to the
35. See generally ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 29, at 235.
36. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 3, 79
Stat. 911, 913 (amending Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 203, 66 Stat.
163, 178-79 (1952)) (amended 1980). This section also allowed admission of "persons uprooted
by catastrophic natural calamity," but it was never used. Id.
37. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 29, at 622.
38. Statistics on use of the parole power can be found in: Note, The Indefinite Detention
of Excluded Aliens: Statutory and Constitutional Justifications and Limitations, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 61, 74 n.49 (1983-84).
39. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(d)(5)(B), 8 U.S.C. § l182(b)(5)(A) (1982) (em-
phasis added).
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quotas already in place for "normal" immigration. These refugee ceilings
for specific countries or regions are determined by the President in consul-
tation with Congress 0 The Act allows consideration of foreign policy as
well as humanitarian interests in the consultation process; parole is therefore
no longer needed as an ideological tool. The 1980 Act returned parole to
its role as an emergency device to be used solely in individual cases.
The parole statute does not explicitly prohibit the Attorney General from
making racial or national origins distinctions when exercising his discretion.
Instead, it provides implicit standards for its exercise which have nothing to
do with race or national origin. The failure to include this prohibition in
the letter of the law may have been due to an oversight on the part of
Congress, or it may have been due to Congress' belief that it was not
necessary to state explicitly what it had elsewhere made clear. Either way,
the statute's facial neutrality requires interpretation. To interpret the neutral
language as congressional permission for the Attorney General to discrim-
inate would be to ignore the wider context of Congressional intent when it
enacted the 1980 Act. It is unfortunate that Rehnquist, who is known for
meticulously applying statutes in conformance with the intent of Congress,
did not support his thesis in Jean v. Nelson with specific references to
legislative history. He apparently did not think that Congressional intent
was even debatable, given that the INS itself agreed that such discrimination
is prohibited in parole cases.4'
2. Asylum
The Court's decision in Jean v. Nelson would probably be worth little
more than a footnote in judicial history if its implications did not go beyond
the administration of parole. As Marshall noted in his dissent, "[the Court's]
restrictive view of discretionary authority with respect to parole decisions
... will presumably affect the scope of [the Attorney General's] permissible
discretion in areas other than parole decisions. ' 42 Marshall was correct in
this prediction, but incorrect in thinking that this view was "adopted in the
face of no authoritative statements limiting such discretion. ' 43 For, if leg-
islative history makes clear the nondiscriminatory intent of the parole statute,
it makes that intent even clearer with respect to the asylum statute.
Prior to the Refugee Act of 1980, 44 U.S. immigration law contained only
40. Id. at § 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1982). Note that under § 207(e)(6) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, foreign policy considerations can be used to determine refugee ceilings.
Thus the exercise of Executive discretion based upon ideology was transferred by the 1980 Act
from the parole area to determination of quotas.
41. Jean v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. at 2992, 2998.
42. Id. at 3005.
43. Id.
44. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
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two provisions specifically designed to assist refugees. Neither of these pro-
visions dealt adequately with the increasingly large number of refugees seek-
ing protection in the U.S.
The first provision permitted "conditional entry" visas to be granted to
aliens who "because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, or political opinion . .. have fled (I) from any Communist
or Communist-dominated country or area, or (II) from any country within
the general area of the Middle East, and ... are unable or unwilling to
return to such country or area on account of race, religion, or political
opinion . . . . 4 This statute, reflecting the ideological bias of its 1950's
cold war origins, became largely irrelevant in the face of the massive influx
of refugees from Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean during
the 1960's and 1970's.
The second provision pertaining to refugees, adopted initially in 1950, was
the Withholding of Deportation statute section 243(h), according to which
[t]he Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien
within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien
would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or political
opinion and for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for
such reason.4
This statute, then, did not provide a positive grant of refuge; it merely
promised not to send the alien back to his homeland.
Section 243(h) did not give broad-based protection to refugees. First, the
statute applied only to "deportable" aliens-persons who enter the U.S.
illegally, or who enter legally but later become deportable because, for
example, they overstay a visa. The statute did not apply to "excludable"
aliens-persons who are deemed never to have entered the U.S. even if
physically present (for example, an alien on his way to an inspection station
within the U.S. border).47 Second, section 243(h) was discretionary: an alien
who could prove he had been persecuted could still be denied relief if the
Attorney General so chose.
45. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 3, 79
Stat. 911, 913 (amending Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 203(a)(7), 66
Stat. 163, 178-79 (1952) (amended 1980). See also ALEINIKOFF & MAMRN, supra note 29, at
622.
46. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952)
(as amended by Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236,
§ 243(h), 79 Stat. 911, 918 (1965)) (amended 1978). The section was again amended in 1978
to disallow the withholding of deportation of aliens who aided Nazi persecution. Immigration
and Nationality Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-549, § 103, 92 Stat. 2065, 2066
(1978) (amended 1980). See Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States Law, 80 COLUM.
L. REv. 1125, 1127 (1980).
47. See Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1125,
1128 (1980). For a more complete explanation see ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 29, at
315. "Entry" is statutorily defined at Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13) (1982).
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The Refugee Act of 1980 made drastic changes in both of these provisions.
The Act made section 243(h) mandatory rather than discretionary. Thus,
"[t]he Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien.., to a country
if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would
be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. ' 48
Second, the Act eliminated the ideologically-charged "conditional entry"
visas and created a new Asylum statute, section 208. Unlike section 243(h),
section 208 went beyond mere withholding of deportation to establish an
alien's positive right to remain in the country "in the discretion of the
Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a
refugee" according to the following definition:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or,
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling
to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of
the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion . . .9
The import and intent of this new legislation becomes clear only when
examined in the context of the congressional desire to bring U.S. law into
conformity with international refugee policy established by the U.N. A brief
look at the development of that policy will make the context clear.
In 1951 the U.N. established its Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, which the U.S. has failed to ratify. This Convention, intended as
a response to the post-war problem of displaced persons, 5° limited its defi-
nition of "refugee" to those whose "well-founded fear of being persecuted"
arose "[als a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951."l Under
article 33 of the Convention, ratifying nations may not "refoule" (return)
a refugee "to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion." Like section 243(h) in U.S.
immigration law, this article did not establish a refugee's right to stay in a
host country; it only provided a right to non-refoulement-a right not to
be returned. However, it apparently applied only to aliens who under U.S.
law would be "excludable" rather than "deportable."
The 1951 Convention is nondiscriminatory. The U.N. explicitly based the
Convention on two principles: "(1) that there should be as little discrimi-
48. Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982).
49. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982).
50. R. LILLICH, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 62-
63 (1984).
51. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 152
[hereinafter Convention].
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nation as possible between nationals, on the one hand, and refugees, on the
other; and (2) that there should be no discrimination based on race, religion
or country of origin among refugees." '5 2 This nondiscriminatory intent was
in the spirit of the U.N. charter, which was entered into force in 1945 to
promote and encourage "universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion." '53
Refugee problems, however, did not diminish with the resettlement of
post-war displaced persons. The U.N. responded to the problem by adopting
the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees of 31 January 1967. The
Protocol modified the Convention by eliminating the time limitation on
granting refugee status. The words "[a]s a result of events occurring before
1 January 1951" were deleted from the definition of "refugee." The rest
of the 1951 Convention was left virtually intact.14 The U.N. Protocol pro-
vided a guide to nations, along with a moral imperative for nations to
respond to the growing refugee crisis. The U.S. responded. It ratified the
Protocol in 1968 and thereby became committed to the nondiscriminatory
refugee provisions of the U.N.
Ratification of the Protocol required the U.S. to update its asylum law.
The Refugee Act of 1980 was designed to correct the deficiencies of U.S.
refugee policy by providing ongoing mechanisms for admission of and aid
to refugees. That commitment is reflected in the language of Withholding
of Deportation statute, section 243(h), and the Asylum statute, section 208,
which incorporates the definition of "refugee" at section 101(a)(42). Both
sections are virtually identical to the corresponding provisions of the U.N.
Protocol.15 The only significant difference is that the Protocol requires only
that a refugee not be deported to his homeland, while section 208 provides
the refugee an actual grant of asylum.
Congressional debate and committee reports on the 1980 Act reveal Con-
gress' intent in enacting the legislation. The Act was to be free from racial
and national origin discrimination and to conform to the U.N. Protocol.5 6
52. UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HuMAN RIGHTS 57 (1978) reprinted in
Goldman & Martin, International Legal Standards Relating to the Rights of Aliens and Refugees
and United States Immigration Law, 5 Hum. RTs. Q. 302, 310 (1983).
53. U.N. CHARTER, art. 55.
54. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, January 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 268
[hereinafter Protocol].
55. Compare Protocol, supra note 54, at 267 (article 1, provision 2) with Immigration and
Nationality Act § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42) (1982) and compare Protocol supra note
54, at 176 (article 33) with Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)
(1982).
56. See 125 CONG. REc. 35,813 (1979) (statement of Rep. Holtzman): "The bill before the
House today ... will mandate equity in our treatment of all refugees; it will bring us into
conformity with our international legal obligations ...." Id. at 35,816; (statement of Rep.
Rodino): "In essence, this legislation would broaden the definition of persons who may be
admitted as refugees under normal immigration to conform to the U.N. Convention and Protocol
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As the Senate report on the Act pointed out, the new definition "eliminates
the geographical and ideological restrictions now applicable to conditional
entrant refugees .... Also, the new definition will bring United States law
into conformity with our international treaty obligations under the United
Nations Protocol ....
C. Asylum and Discretion: A Problem of Interpretation
The historical evidence leaves little doubt that Congress intended all pro-
visions of the 1980 Act to be free of invidious discrimination. The doubt
that remains arises because of the language Congress used in writing the
Asylum and Withholding statutes. Section 243(h) makes withholding of
deportation mandatory, while section 208 seems to make granting of asylum,
discretionary. One could argue, therefore, that the former requires nondis-
crimination in conformance with the U.N. Protocol, whereas the latter does
not.
This problem of interpretation was at issue in INS v. Stevic58 The Court
held that the standard of proof used for granting asylum is different from
that for withholding of deportation. The language of section 208 calls for
proof of a "well-founded fear of persecution" while the standard for section
243(h) was found to be a "clear probability of persecution."
The distinction drawn by the Court between the two required standards
of proof is spurious 9 and rests upon what immigration scholar John Scanlan
has called a "deficient reading of the legislative history." 6 There is no
evidence that Congress took this distinction into account when it wrote the
1980 Act.6' There is sound evidence, on the other hand, that Congress sought
.... Id. at 35,820 (statement of Rep. Chisholm): "This redefinition eliminates the current
geographical and ideological restrictions which limit the designation of refugee status to persons
fleeing Communist or Middle Eastern countries and brings U.S. law into conformity with the
internationally accepted definition of "refugee" as articulated by the 1951 U.N. Refugee
Convention and the Protocol which was ratified by the United States in 1968." See also 126
CONG. REC. 3756 (1980) (statement of Sen. Kennedy): "This legislation will also insure greater
equity in our treatment of all refugees. It will rationalize and write into the statute how we
respond to refugee emergencies. And it will make our law conform to the United Nations
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which we signed in 1969." See
also SENATE AND HOUSE COMMS. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., IST SESS., U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 158 (Joint Comm. Print 1981): "By emphasizing persecution
and the fear of persecution without regard to national origin, the Refugee Act establishes
criteria based on special humanitarian concerns."
57. S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 141, 144.
58. 104 S. Ct. 2489 (1984).
59. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 29, at 665.
60. Lecture by Professor John Scanlan, Immigration Law Class, Indiana University (Nov.
1985).
61. See H. CONF. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 160, 161, where the conference refers to both withholding and asylum
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to conform immigration law to U.N. treaty obligations. "There is no doubt
that Congress intended the definition of 'refugee' in the 1980 Act to conform
to that in the Protocol." 62 The Court's distinction is also contrary to the
way the INS itself treats the two provisions. The INS takes the standard of
proof in both provisions to be identical. In fact, it requires aliens to fill out
the same forms whether they are applying for withholding of deportation,
asylum, or both.63
Discretionary language in the asylum statute, therefore, does not imply
that the Attorney General's discretion permits him to make distinctions based
upon race or national origin. Congress as well as the INS intend that the
two statutes be treated the same in this respect.
The 1980 Refugee Act reflected a growing international awareness that all
citizens of the world have the right to be treated equally. Seen in this context,
it would be difficult to maintain that U.S. asylum law was intended to be
applied in other than a nondiscriminatory fashion. If there were any lingering
doubts about this, Jean v. Nelson should allay them, for the legislative
history that supports the conclusion that the parole statute is nondiscrimi-
natory does the same for the asylum statute.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF NONDISCRIMINATORY INTENT OF ASYLUM
STATUTES
Although the Court's analysis of legislative history in Jean v. Nelson was
lacking, its conclusions were accurate. By affirming the nondiscriminatory
intent of the parole statute, and by extension, the asylum statute, the Court
in effect served notice that racial or nationality discrimination against any
asylum applicant would not be tolerated. If the Court's decision is to be
more than mere words, practical changes must be made at the administrative
level of asylum adjudication to ensure mechanisms are in place to prevent
discrimination. Two areas especially in need of reform are discussed in this
section.
without distinguishing them. Note also that both provisions derive from the United Nations
Convention as amended by the Protocol. Asylum section 208 is taken from article 1 and
withholding section 243(h) is taken from article 33. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
62. See Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 243, 251 (1984).
63. Matter of Acosta, Interim Dec. No. -, slip op. at 19-20 (B.I.A. March 1, 1985),
reprinted in ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 29, at 668. Further, immigration scholars have
recommended that the two sections be combined to eliminate the confusion. See Scanlan, supra
note 33, at 637. See also, How Do We Distinguish Who is Entitled to Asylum in the United
States and Who is Not?, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Imm. and Refugee Policy of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1981) (statement of Doris Meissner).
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A. State Department Advisory Opinions
Asylum regulations require that the INS district director request an ad-
visory opinion from the State Department's Bureau of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs for each asylum applicant. 64 This requirement appears
innocuous since it applies equally to every applicant. In practice, however,
these advisory opinions may be subject to discriminatory use, contrary to
statutory intent and the Jean v. Nelson mandate.
Evidence to document an asylum claim can be difficult to garner. Refugees
in some cases flee their homelands with nothing more than the clothes on
their backs. The Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
recognized this problem and published the "Handbook" for implementing
the U.N. Protocol. The Handbook says lack of evidence makes it "frequently
necessary to give the alien the benefit of the doubt," but that the alien's
statements "must not run counter to generally known facts. ' 65 As a source
of generally known facts about a particular country, the U.S. State De-
partment undoubtedly has some expertise. Its advisory opinions, therefore,
can provide important information to help the INS document asylum claims.
By supplying factual details about political conditions in a given country,
for example, the State Department can help the INS determine the credence
of an asylum applicant's claims. Theoretically, "advisory opinions are not
binding on the INS, but are merely recommendations" intended to assist
the INS in doing its job.66
The practical use made of these advisory opinions, however, in fact far
exceeds the theoretical rationale behind them. For the INS does not usually
regard State Department advisory opinions as mere recommendations, but
as dispositive of the case at hand.67 The appellate court in Zamora v. LN.S.
64. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7 (1986).
65. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON
PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS, 48 (1979) [hereinafter Hand-
book].
Authority for the Handbook is established by the Protocol at article 2 and the Convention
at article 35. Protocol, supra note 54, at 270; Convention, supra note 51, at 176. See also
Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401, 405-06 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. INS v. Stevic, 104 S. Ct.
2489 (1984): "The Handbook is a response to requests for guidance as to the Protocol's
requirements and is based on the High Commissioner's 25 years of experience, the practices
of governments acceding to the Protocol and literature on the subject."
66. Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25 v. Smith, 594 F. Supp. 502, 514
(D.D.C. 1984). See generally id. at 510-14.
67. How Do We Determine Who is Entitled to Asylum in the United States and Who is
Not?, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on lmm. and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 123 (1981) (prepared statement of John A. Scanlan). "ITihe
present system-in which the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (B.H.R.H.A.)
of the Department of State comments 'individually' on each asylum application via an 'advisory
opinion' which is not individually composed, and which cannot be, given present B.H.R.H.A.
staffing levels, and in which INS personnel customarily regard such 'advisory opinions' as
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noted this fact when it upheld a denial of asylum and found that improper
consideration of State Department advisory opinions constituted harmless
error. 6 The Zamora court observed that the State Department is the "obvious
source of information on general conditions in the foreign country," but
that its recommendations "do both. too little and too much." The opinions
"give little or nothing in the way of useful information about conditions in
the foreign country," yet they "recommend how the district director should
decide the particular petitioner's request for asylum," creating a "risk that
such communications will carry a weight they do not deserve. ' 69 The Zamora
court found that State Department opinions should be admissible in asylum
cases as a source of information on conditions of persecution in a country,
but that these opinions should not attempt to give adjudicative facts regarding
a particular case. ° State Department practices have not conformed to the
Zamora dictates and "still typically take a position on the merits of the
individual application under review." 71
An "individualized" determination made by the State Department is usu-
ally a mere form letter with little detailed information. 72 Such letters by and
large are "conclusory and unenlightening. ' 73 The State Department cannot
possibly process claims individually, given current staffing levels and the
volume of applications. 74 Even if an alien should have the resources to do
so, she will have difficulty refuting State Department information, since the
basis for a State Department opinion is not usually disclosed either to the
alien or to the INS.7 5
Immigration judges almost invariably follow State Department opinions,
however, because they lack expertise on conditions in foreign countries, are
overworked, 76 and probably believe that the State Department knows best.
In the words of one INS adjudicator: "I would never, never overrule the
State Department. ' 7
The Refugee Act of 1980 was designed to be ideologically neutral in asylum
cases, but current use of State Department advisory opinions calls this
theoretical neutrality into question.7 8 Aliens of different nationalities are
dispositive (as we have been repeatedly told that. they do)-is by its very nature unfair."
(Emphasis in original).
68. Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d 1055 (2d Cir. 1976).
69. Id. at 1062-63.
70. Id.
71. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 29, at 704.
72. Id.
73. Helton, supra note 62, at 261.
74. Scanlan, supra note 33, at 628.
75. Asylum Procedures, 8 C.F.R. § 208.10(b)-(d) (1986). The regulations allow "classified"
information in State Department opinions to be "non-record." Id.
76. Scanlan, Who is a Refugee? Procedures and Burden of Proof Under the Refugee Act
of 1980, 5 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 30 (1983).
77. Helton, supra note 62, at 261.
78. Id.: "[Tihe ideological allocation of asylum, once expressly recognized by statute,
continues in practice under the 1980 Refugee Act."
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accorded disparate treatment. 79 Nancy Merritt, chairperson of the American
Association of Immigration Lawyers commented: "People come to me, and
even if they have a truly tragic story of oppression, the first question you
have to ask is, 'What country are you from?' " Merritt concluded that if
that country is not on the State Department's friendly list, receiving asylum
is nearly impossible.80
Because the State Department is a political institution, subject to partisan
pressures, its objectivity is questionable. As political scientist Elizabeth Hull
observes, "if the President certifies that Haiti, for instance, or El Salvador,
is making progress in the area of human rights, the State Department can
scarcely concede that an applicant for asylum from either country risks
political persecution without embarrassing and even countering the Admin-
istration." 8
An appellate court reached the same conclusion in Kasravi v. INS,82 a
case involving an Iranian student's petition for withholding relief under
section 243(h). The Kasravi court noted that the only evidence offered in
opposition to the petition was a "perfunctory letter written by a State
79. See U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Asylum Cases
Filed with District Director by Selected Countries Fiscal Year 1984, 33 INS REPORTER 10 (1985)
for statistics on grants of asylum for fiscal year 1984:
Pending Pending
Nationality Begin '84 Received Granted Denied End '84
Total All
Countries 165,998 24,295 8,278 32,344 138,601
Afghanistan 598 153 186 269 175
Cuba 115,162 3,401 16 472 121,937
El Salvador 13,501 5,455 328 13,045 1,335
Ethiopia 1,410 415 305 1,014 307
Guatemala 629 510 3 758 267
Haiti 5,487 2,163 23 352 7,265
Iran 9,661 3,488 5,017 3,216 3,213
Iraq 508 118 38 289 206
Lebanon 577 418 16 518 288
Nicaragua 11,708 4,807 1,018 7,274 1,644
Poland 1,843 852 721 1,482 476
Romania 318 159 158 246 76
USSR 91 44 45 43 29
80. Korn, Hiding in the Open, STUDENT LAW., Jan. 1986, at 25 (interview with Nancy Mer-
ritt). This article also contains an analysis of the INS statistics found in note 79 supra:
In 1981 and 1982, 1,139 Salvadorans applied for asylum and only 67 (5.8 percent)
were granted it. In 1983, two percent of Salvadoran asylum applications were granted,
according to statistics complied [sic] by the Center for Constitutional Rights. Ap-
proval rates for refugees from Soviet block countries run from 29 percent for Poles
and 78 percent for Soviets. In 1984, 13,000 Salvadorans were denied asylum upon
application and 328 (2.5 percent) were approved according to State Department
statistics. The approval total ranks fourth among national refugees to this country.
In contrast to Salvadorans, 8,000 Nicaraguans-from a country not deemed friendly
by the United States-applied for asylum in 1984, and 1,000 (12.5 percent) were
approved. From all countries in 1984, 8,000 asylum cases were approved (20 per-
cent) and 32,000 were denied.
Id.
81. E. HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ALIENS 122 (1985).
82. 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968).
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Department official concluding generally that an Iranian student would not
in all likelihood be persecuted for activities in the United States."" Although
the court upheld the INS officer's discretionary authority to deny the student
relief, 4 it strongly criticized use of State Department opinions:
Not only does this letter lack persuasiveness, but the competency of State
Department letters in matters of this kind is highly questionable....
Such letters from the State Department do not carry the guarantees of
reliability which the law demands of admissible evidence. A frank, but
official, discussion of the political shortcomings of a friendly nation is
not always compatible with the high duty to maintain advantageous
diplomatic relations with nations throughout the world. The traditional
foundation required of expert testimony is lacking; nor can official
position be said to supply an acceptable substitute. 8
If INS adjudicators continue to be required by regulation to request advisory
opinions from the State Department, the source of these opinions must be
considered in light of the potential for politically-motivated discrimination.
The U.N. Handbook suggests that an examiner in an asylum case "use
all the means at his disposal to produce the necessary evidence in support
of the application. ' 86 If asylum decisions are to be more than "rubber
stamps" for the State Department, then current use of such opinions must
be re-evaluated. An examiner should use all the information at his disposal
to determine the credibility of the petitioner's claim including, for example,
information from the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, church groups,
international human rights organizations, as well as the State Department.
7
Documenting intentional discrimination is difficult, 8  but the current reliance
on State Department advisory opinions in asylum adjudication does not meet
the nondiscriminatory requirements articulated in Jean v. Nelson: "indivi-
dualized determinations . . .without regard to race or national origin." 89
B. Standard of Review in Asylum Cases
When a federal court has the opportunity to review a decision made by
an immigration judge, 9° the standard of review used can determine the
83. Id. at 676-77.
84. Note that this case was prior to the Refugee Act of 1980, so Withholding of Deportation
§ 243(h) was discretionary. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. Under today's statute,
the outcome in Kasravi would likely have been different.
85. Id. at 677 & 677 n. 1.
86. Handbook, supra note 65, at 47.
87. Scanlan, supra note 76, at 36.
88. Note, supra note 47, at 1132:
The persistence of covert discretionary elements in asylum decisions is also evident
in the disparate treatment accorded aliens of different nationalities. Documenting
an intentionally discriminatory pattern in this connection is difficult, since the INS
and the Board do not expressly refer to considerations of geographic origin, economic
status, or political allegiance. Nonetheless, some considerations of domestic and
foreign policy seem clearly to influence many asylum decisions.
89. Jean v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. at 2999.
90. The standard of review issue hinges in part on whether asylum cases are reviewable at
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outcome of the appeal. If the question before the court is whether the judge
"abused his discretion," the review will not be intensive, since the appellate
court needs assurance only that the judge did not act arbitrarily or irra-
tionally. If, on the other hand, the question is whether substantial evidence
existed to support the judge's decision, then the reviewing court must take
a more intensive look at the nature of the evidence. This section will argue
that the "substantial evidence test" must be used in review of asylum
decisions to protect petitioners against invidious discrimination.
Prior to 1980, "courts traditionally reviewed asylum denials using an
'abuse of discretion' test-theoretically the review standard most deferential
to the administrative agency whose action is under scrutiny." 9' As noted
earlier, section 243(h) became mandatory under the 1980 Act. Some reviewing
courts found that the standard of review could no longer be the "abuse of
discretion" test, because discretion no longer existed under the statute. These
all in federal court. Under Immigration and Nationality Act, § 106(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1982),
final orders of "exclusion" can obtain judicial review only through habeas corpus proceedings.
An alien who has made no "entry" into the U.S. is not deportable under Immigration and
Nationality Act § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982), but rather is "excludable" under Immigration
and Nationality Act § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Thus an asylum applicant
who is merely excludable, but not deportable, can gain access to federal court only if he is
seeking release from custody. For example, an alien who has applied for asylum at a consular
office overseas and had his application denied cannot petition to have the denial reviewed by
a federal court in the U.S. But if the alien had managed to illegally enter the U.S. and was
caught and placed in detention, he could petition to have his asylum denial reviewed in federal
court in habeas corpus proceedings. See, e.g., Sarkis v. Nelson, 585 F. Supp. 235 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) where an appellate court reviewed an asylum denial in a habeas corpus proceeding.
Another avenue also exists to obtain review of an asylum decision in federal court. Under
Immigration and Nationality Act § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1982), all "final orders of depor-
tation" are reviewable by a federal court of appeals. In Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 229 (1963),
the Supreme Court held that the term "final orders of deportation" was meant to include not
only the actual order of deportation, but all orders closely related to the deportation proceeding.
Therefore, the court of appeals in Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 1984)
found "no problem with undertaking direct review of asylum decisions made by immigrationjudges in the context of deportation proceedings (citation omitted)," since the deportation and
asylum issues so closely relate.
This avenue of review, then, could be used to get an asylum claim into federal court in
conjunction with a deportation claim. One type of deportaton order that is reviewable in federal
court is a denial of "withholding of deportation" under Immigration and Nationality Act §
243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982). Since asylum applications are normally filed along with
claims for withholding of deportation, a federal court of appeals could review the denials of
both claims together. See, e.g., Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1984).
So, under current immigration law, an asylum denial is reviewable in federal court in a
habeas corpus proceeding or in conjunction with a deportation proceeding. An excludable alien
who cannot avail himself of either of these proceedings cannot get an asylum denial reviewed
in federal court. His only avenue for appeal is within the agency itself. This situation favors
aliens who sneak into the U.S. and are either held in physical custody or subject to deportation,
and disfavors aliens who use proper channels to apply for asylum. The Senate has debated
measures to rectify this injustice, but the full debate is beyond the scope of this Note.
91. ALINucoFF & MARTIN, supra note 29, at 700-01. See, e.g., Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d
at 677 (9th Cir. 1968), a suspension of deportation case, where the court found that the scope
of review did not permit it to "substitute its opinion for that of the Attorney General (citation
omitted)."
19861
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
courts chose to employ the more stringent "substantial evidence" test to
determine "whether the agency's determination ... [was] substantially sup-
ported."92
The standard of review under section 208 is also potentially troublesome.
Some courts have used a two-tiered approach. On one tier, the substantial
evidence test is used to determine whether an alien has a well-founded fear
of persecution. If the court finds that he does, it proceeds to the second
tier and applies the abuse of discretion test to determine whether the Attorney
General exceeded his discretion in denying the alien's asylum claim. As the
court explained in Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS:
As we do when reviewing other non-discretionary agency determinations
... we apply a substantial evidence test when reviewing the factual
finding whether an alien has demonstrated a well-founded fear of per-
secution. When refugee status has been established, we review the At-
torney General's grant or denial of asylum under the abuse of discretion
standard that we apply to other discretionary actions of the BIA [Bureau
of Immigration Affairs]. 91
Under this two-tiered approach, section 208 asylum claims and section
243(h) withholding claims are treated the same with respect to the factual
matter of whether an alien qualifies for relief under the statute. The sub-
stantial evidence test is used in both cases. In section 208 asylum claims,
however, "if the immigration judge finds that the applicant qualifies as a
'refugee,' but nonetheless decides to deny the applicant asylum in the exercise
of the judge's discretion," the reviewing court "will not overturn the decision
unless it was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." ' 94
Other courts have avoided the two-tiered approach and continue to employ
only the "abuse of discretion" standard.95 The Marroquin-Manriquez v. INS
court, for example, specifically disavowed the two-tiered approach. The court
found that the substantial evidence test ignored the expertise of the immi-
gration judge.96
The Jean v. Nelson decision implies that the Attorney General's discretion
is irrelevant in a discrimination inquiry. The decision thereby clarifies the
appellate court's role in reviewing asylum denials. Since the only way to
uncover discriminatory practices is to look at all the evidence, the Jean v.
92. McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1981). The McMullen court determined
that: "The role of the reviewing court necessarily changes when the charge to the agency changes
from one of discretion to an imperative." Id. See also Chavarria v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 722
F.2d 666, 670 (11th Cir. 1984).
93. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 749 F.2d at 1321 n.9 (citations omitted). See also Carvajal-
Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d at 567; Sarkis v. Nelson, 585 F. Supp. at 238.
94. Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d at 567-68.
95. See Marroquin-Manriquez v. INS, 699 F.2d 129, 133 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1259 (1984); Sotto v. INS, 748 F.2d 832, 837 (3d Cir. 1984).
96. Marroquin-Manriquez v. INS, 699 F.2d at 133 n.5.
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Nelson decision requires the substantial evidence standard of review to be
used exclusively in appeals based upon alleged discrimination.
Some might argue, however, that the abuse of discretion standard is
sufficient, since discrimination would be an obvious abuse of discretion. 97
This is not the case, because what is normally looked at under this standard
is the policy, not the evidence, used by the INS adjudicator in denying a
claim.
In Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti,98 the abuse of discretion standard
was used to uncover discrimination; but, the appellate court there was
concerned with the INS policy of systematically denying, without regard to
their individual merits, asylum claims from Haitians.9 Although it recognized
the discretionary nature of asylum relief, the court found that this discretion
could not be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.' °0 The court also recognized
that discrimination based on race or national origin is not allowed under
the 1980 Act. 0' An extensive review of the evidence led the court to conclude
that the INS had developed a "Program" to deport Haitians, thus abusing
its discretion by violating the aliens' "constitutional, statutory, treaty and
administrative rights."' 02 This case affirmed not only the nondiscriminatory
nature of asylum law, but also the limits of the Attorney General's discretion.
Haitian Refugee Center concerned an established INS policy of denying
asylum to Haitians.103 The abuse of discretion standard of review is designed
to review policy decisions made by the INS. In individual cases, where no
large-scale program or policy to discriminate exists, if the immigration judge
can articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory policy reason to deny asylum,
the inquiry is typically ended. The abuse of discretion standard, therefore,
will not protect an individual who may suffer discrimination because of the
"personal attitudes and biases of the individual decision makers."'' 04 This
problem is exacerbated by a lack of guidelines regarding how discretion can
generally be exercised in immigration law.10s
97. See Wong Wing Hang v. INS, 360 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1966): Even prior to the
Refugee Act of 1980, an immigration judge could abuse his discretion if its exercise was "made
without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an
impermissible basis such as an invidious discrimination against a particular race or group, or,
in Judge Learned Hand's words, on other 'considerations that Congress could not have intended
to make relevant.' " Cf. Note, From Mezei to Jean: Toward the Exit of the Entry Doctrine,
22 SAN DiEGo L. REV. 1143, 1168 (1985).
98. 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), judgment modified, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir.
1982).
99. Id. at 532.
100. Id. at 452.
101. Id. at 453.
102. Id. at 532.
103. Cf. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25 v. Smith, 563 F. Supp. at 163.
104. Roberts, The Exercise of Administrative Discretion Under the Immigration Laws, 13
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 144, 148 (1975).
105. See id. at 147.
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To avoid discrimination in individual cases, reviewing courts must use the
substantial evidence test whenever prima facie evidence of discrimination is
demonstrated.'06 An immigration judge should not be able to avoid review
under the substantial evidence test simply by stating, "this alien qualifies as
a refugee, but I have exercised my discretion to deny him asylum."
The substantial evidence test should also be used to examine State De-
partment advisory opinions in asylum cases in which discrimination is alleged.
This test requires that evidence be on the record. It would therefore require
the State Department to change its current practice of not revealing the
sources of its information. The test would also preclude using State De-
partment advisory opinions as the sole determinant of whether an alien
qualifies as a refugee for asylum purposes.'0 7
Until all discretionary language is removed from immigration statutes,
courts will have to define the limits of discretionary authority, and the
possibility of the discriminatory exercise of that authority will persist. 08 The
Jean v. Nelson decision should decrease the range of this possibility by
requiring a heightened level of judicial review regarding the factual bases
for asylum decisions.'09
CONCLUSION
The Jean v. Nelson decision confirmed the distance U.S. immigration law
has traveled from restrictionism to a recognition of the rights of aliens as
citizens of the world. By refusing to sanction discrimination in parole de-
cisions, Jean v. Nelson set a precedent that affects asylum adjudication as
well. To declare that asylum petitions must be evaluated in a nondiscrimi-
natory manner is one thing; to implement this policy is another. The Court's
ruling demands more than token compliance by the INS. It requires a
106. Cf. Note, supra note 47, at 1133.
107. Cf. Scanlan, supra note 76, at 34:
Because the law has changed, and administrative decisions must now be supported
by substantial evidence on the record, continuation of the practice of soliciting
advisory opinions for every applicant and the use of such opinions to support blanket
denials of asylum to all claimants from particular countries, including those coun-
tries where evidence of widespread human rights violations is strong, may well con-
stitute a systematic denial of due process.
Scanlan here refers to § 243(h) withholding claims, but as this Note argues, the substantial evidence
test should also apply in § 208 asylum cases when the alien can make out a prima facie case
of discrimination.
108. See Helton, The Proper Role of Discretion in Political Asylum Determinations, 22 SAN
DIEoo L. REv. 999, 1019 (1985): "This injection of discretion into the asylum standard, however,
threatens to swallow the right to apply for asylum in the United States."
109. The same considerations should also apply to review of parole decisions-the factual
basis for a claim should be examined under the "substantial evidence" test if invidious dis-
crimination is at issue. However, since eligibility requirements under this statute are not as
clearly defined as under the asylum statute, and are not based clearly upon international law,
the argument for the use of the "substantial evidence" test is harder to make, and is beyond
the scope of this Note.
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concerted effort by INS administrators and the judiciary to eliminate the
mechanisms that make discrimination possible.
Current misuse of State Department advisory opinions in asylum cases,
coupled with the courts' inconsistent application of review standards, serve
to frustrate the intent of immigration law. Both the INS and appellate courts
must review carefully the broad range of available evidence when considering
asylum claims. Only by doing so can they honor the mandate of the Court
and uphold the democratic process that has given aliens the statutory right
to seek asylum without being discriminated against on the basis of their race
or national origin.
MARY JANE LAPOINTE

